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and stability rest in large measure on the internal security of nations. Analysts
have long examined factors such as arms transfers and ethnic violence in this
regard, but the list now includes variables that were not traditionally viewed
as related to national security. Unemployment rates, water tables and river
ºows, infant mortality, migration patterns, infectious disease epidemiology,
and a whole host of other variables that tap into the general stability of a soci-
ety are now understood to affect security. To understand the long-term security
dynamics of a region, one must inquire into what Thomas Homer-Dixon and
others have termed the “environmental security” of the nations therein.1
Our own research is surely located in that ªeld of inquiry, yet we contem-
plate a variable that has been by and large neglected even by scholars of envi-
ronmental security. One overlooked wellspring of insecurity, we argue, is
exaggerated gender inequality. Security scholarship is theoretically and empir-
ically impoverished to the extent that it fails to inquire into the relationship be-
tween violence against women and violence within and between societies. We
believe that our research demonstrates that the long-term security trajectory of
a region is affected by this relationship.ASurplus of Men, A Deªcit of Peace
Admittedly, there is probably no society in which women do not experience
some gender inequality, meaning subordinate status or inferior treatment
in political, legal, social, or economic matters. Indeed, what would constitute
a perfect society between men and women is a controversial topic with
which we are not concerned here. However, exaggerated gender inequality
is hard to miss: We deªne it to be present when, because of gender, one child
is allowed to live while another is actively or passively killed.2 Offspring sex
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1. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1999).
2. “Passive killing” refers to such phenomena as withholding food from a newborn or abandoning
a newborn in the wild. Though not an active killing, such as smothering a child, the intent to kill is
clear, and so is termed passive killing.
selection,3 almost universally used to favor male offspring, indicates that the
life of a female in the society is not only not valued but actually despised.
There can be no greater evidence of the extremely unequal and subordinate
status of women in a society than the presence of prevalent offspring sex selec-
tion therein.
If violence against women within a society bears any relationship to violence
within and between societies, then it should be possible to see that relationship
at work in societies where violence against women is exaggerated—that is,
where offspring sex selection is prevalent. Speciªcally, internal instability is
heightened in nations displaying exaggerated gender inequality, leading to an
altered security calculus for the state. Possibilities of meaningful democracy
and peaceful foreign policy are diminished as a result.
We ªrst quantify the scale on which sex ratios are being altered in Asia, then
estimate the number of resulting surplus young adult males currently present
in Asia’s two largest states, China and India, as well as projected to the year
2020. Next, we discuss behavioral syndromes associated with surplus young
adult male groups, and investigate the role of such groups in instability and vi-
olence within and between societies in several historical cases. Finally, we ask
whether these same phenomena are beginning to be seen in China and India
today, and raise broader issues of governance and foreign policy in high sex-
ratio societies.
Modern Prevalence of Offspring Sex Selection
The practice of offspring sex selection can be found in a large variety of histori-
cal cultures from all continents. In virtually all cases, the selection was in favor
of male infants. Here we concentrate on the modern incidence of offspring sex
selection and seek to quantify its scale.
Two statistics set the stage for our discussion: the birth sex ratio and the
overall sex ratio. Normal birth sex ratios range between 105 and 107 male
births per 100 female births. This normal range holds across racial groups,
though there may be some parental age-related or diet-related variations
within such groups. The overall sex ratio (i.e., the sex ratio across all ages)
tends toward 1:1 or less, reºecting a combination of increased female mortality
from childbearing, but longer female life span.
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3. Offspring sex selection should not to be confused with the term “sex selection” as used by evo-
lutionary biologists to refer to the calculus by which males and females choose mates; “offspring
sex selection” refers to the selective rearing of children based on sex. Female infanticide and sex-
selective abortion are two examples of offspring sex selection.
overall sex ratios
Ansley Coale suggests that the sex ratio for a stationary population (as deter-
mined by Western model life tables) is between 97.9 and 100.3 males per 100 fe-
males.4 (In the remainder of the article, the ratio is expressed as the number of
males per 100 females—that is, 105:100 is rendered as 105 and the “100” should
be assumed after each such number throughout the article.) A population with
a young age structure may have a slightly higher overall sex ratio than a popu-
lation with an older age structure. Table 1 provides sex ratios for overall popu-
lations by continent.
As Table 1 shows, the sex ratio favors the male population only in Oceania
(slightly) and in Asia. A glance at overall sex ratios and population sizes for
each country in Asia indicates that the highest sex ratios are found in Afghani-
stan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, China, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Taiwan. The large populations found in several of these countries mean
that the majority of “missing” females can be attributed to them.
Examining the seven countries listed in Table 2, we ªnd that from 66 to 86
million of the missing females in Asia are attributable to them alone, with two
countries in particular contributing the majority of missing females due to
their high sex ratios and large population size: China and India together con-
tribute between 62 and 68 million of the missing females in Asia. This is, how-
ever, but a rough estimation of the effects of sex-selective abortion, female
infanticide, differential mortality rates, and other discriminatory practices
against females. More than a decade ago, Amartya Sen asserted that the num-
ber of missing Asian females had already surpassed 100 million.5
birth sex ratios
Birth sex ratios are a very valuable piece of information but are sometimes
difªcult to obtain. They are also relatively unreliable for several reasons. First,
birth registration in very large or predominantly rural countries may not be ac-
curate because of the number of births occurring outside of a hospital. Indeed,
for this very reason some nations do not even report a birth sex ratio. Second,
birth sex ratios may be highly politicized and subject to bureaucratic “adjust-
ment” in some cultures. Third, birth sex ratios may mask troubling phenom-
ena. For example, though the 1992 overall birth sex ratio for South Korea was
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4. Ansley Coale, “Excess Female Mortality and the Balance of the Sexes in the Population: An Esti-
mate of the Number of ‘Missing Females,’” Population and Development Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep-
tember 1991), p. 518.
5. Amartya Sen, “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing,” New York Review of Books, Decem-
ber 20, 1990, pp. 61–66.
reported as an abnormally high 114, the sex ratio for fourth children born in
that same year was an astounding 228.6.6 Another example is that birth sex ra-
tios may be lower than the sex ratios of early childhood. In India the birth sex
ratio is reported to be 111–114; however, the sex ratio for ages 0–6 has dropped
precipitously in the last ten years, and in some states the early childhood sex
ratio is higher than the reported birth sex ratio. In Punjab, for example, the 0–6
sex ratio is now greater than 126, while its birth sex ratio is reported to be
122.8. Despite the incomplete picture afforded by birth sex ratios, we present
such information as we have on the countries of Asia in Table 3.
All of the birth sex ratios for the countries listed in Table 3 are signiªcantly
higher than the 105–107 range considered normal across racial groups. Though
in times past, methods of offspring sex selection included active and passive
female infanticide, for these birth sex ratios to hold, prenatal offspring sex se-
lection favoring males must be widespread. Indeed the evidence suggests that
such is the case. Even accounting for underregistration and adoption of fe-
males, the skewness of these sex ratios is very real and is worsening over time.
Tradition can be a stubborn force, slow to die or change. Laws on the books
may simply be ignored in favor of misogynist tradition. Although prenatal sex
tests are illegal in China, and in most states in India, such testing is neverthe-
less ubiquitous in both nations. Sex-selective abortion is illegal in both China
and India, as, of course, is infanticide. As one scholar notes, “The sudden in-
creases in sex ratios in East Asian societies are impressive—in each country,
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6. Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility Society:
Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 1
(March 1995), p. 66, Table 6.
Table 1. Overall Sex Ratios by Continent, 2001.
Continent Male Population
Female
Population Overall Sex Ratio
Africa 411,253,443 411,986,267 99.8
Asia 1,907,090,382 1,829,783,975 104.2
Europe 351,404,742 377,571,861 93.1
North America 239,028,087 247,004,746 96.8
Oceania 15,563,506 15,473,003 100.6
South America 173,486,299 177,333,047 97.8
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base, IDB Aggregation, Table 094,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html/.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Reported Birth Sex Ratios for Selected Asian Nations.
Country
Reported Birth Sex
Ratio Year and Source of Information
China 121.0 1993 and 1994 State Family Planning Commission
of China, Zhongguo shengyu nianjin, 1996 [China
birth planning yearbook, 1996]
113.8–115.4 1989–90, Zeng et al., 1993
115.62 1994.10.1–1995.9.30; State Statistical Bureau of
China (SSB) (1.04 percent sample)
116.57 October 1, 1995, SSB (1.04 percent sample)
118.65 April 1, 1995, SSB (1.04 percent sample)
120.0 1999, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
131–400 Anecdotal reports for particular regions/towns
by journalists and scholars, 1995–2000
Taiwan 110.2 1990, Gu and Roy, 1995
South Korea 109.6 2001, National Statistical Office of South Korea,
July 2001
114.0 1990, Park and Cho, 1995
116.9 1992, Park and Cho, 1995
117.9 1990, first births only, Park and Cho, 1995
India 111.0 1996–98, SRS data, reported in Premi, 2001
113.7 1993–95, Jhunjhunwala, 2001
112.2 1981–91, hospital births, Office of the Registrar
General, 1991
123.3 1996–98, SRS data for the state of Haryana,
reported in Premi, 2001
132.0 1993, one hospital in Punjab, Booth et al., 1994
156.0 1990, town of Rohtak near New Delhi, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 1991
SOURCES: State Family Planning Commission of China, China Birth Planning Yearbook
(Beijing, 1996); Yi Zeng, Tu Ping, Gu Baochang, Xu Yi, Li Bohua, and Li Youngping,
“Causes and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in
China,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 283–302;
State Statistical Bureau, China Population Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics
Press, 1996), 1.04 percent samples for October 1994, April 1995, and October 1995;
personal communication with the director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences via
e-mail based on article in the Nando Times entitled “China Reportedly Has 20 Percent
More Males Than Females,” January 7, 1999; Gu Baochang and Krishna Roy, “Sex Ratio
at Birth in China, with Reference to Other Areas in Asia: What We Know,” Asia-Pacific Pop-
ulation Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 17–42; 2001 Report of the National
Statistical Office of South Korea (Seoul, July 2001); Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho,
“Consequences of Son Preference in a Low Fertility Society: Imbalance of the Sex Ratio At
Birth in Korea,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 59–
84; Mahendra Premi, “The Missing Girl Child,” Economic and Political Weekly, May 26,
2001, pp. 1875–1880; Bharat Jhunjhunwala, “Sex Ratio Riddles,” Statesman (India), June
2, 2001; Office of the Registrar General of India, Compendium of India’s Fertility and Mor-
tality Indicators Based on the SRS (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1991); Beverly E.
Booth, Manorama Verma, and Rajbir Singh Beri, “Fetal Sex Determination in Infants in
Punjab, India: Correlations and Implications,” British Medical Journal, Vol. 304 (1994),
pp. 1259–1261; and Hamish McDonald, “Unwelcome Sex,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 26, 1991, pp. 18–19.
within a single year the sex ratio has jumped to a high level that has subse-
quently been sustained. This suggests that people have been anxiously await-
ing the availability of sex-control technology . . . and that couples actively use
such technology, regardless of fertility level.”7
The Chinese government has begun to address the problem of sex selection
more seriously in recent years. Indeed Zeng Yi, director of the Demography In-
stitute at Beijing University, freely admits, “The loss of female births due to il-
legal prenatal sex determination and sex-selective abortion and female
infanticide will affect the true sex ratio at birth and at young ages, creating an
unbalanced population sex structure in the future and resulting in potentially
serious social problems.”8 A vast demographic shift is taking place in Asia be-
cause of these new technologies. The scale on which sex ratios are being
skewed in Asia is arguably unprecedented in human history. Furthermore, it is
worthwhile to remember that China and India alone comprise more than 38
percent of the world’s population. This peculiarly Asian phenomenon may
have ramiªcations beyond that region.
The Other Side of the Ratio: Surplus Males
Selection against female offspring produces an excess proportion of males in
society: surplus males. Given the long history of son preference in China, it is
not surprising that the Chinese have a special term for such surplus males:
guang gun-er (also transliterated as guanggun, guangguer, or guanguen), alterna-
tively translated as “bare sticks” or “bare branches,” indicating those male
branches of a family tree that would never bear fruit because no marriage part-
ner might be found for them.
Given our focus on security, we are most interested in bare branches who are
in the age group 15–34/35, as this is the male age group that commits the pre-
ponderance of violence within a society. Howmany young adult bare branches
are there now, and how many are there expected to be in the next two decades
in the two most populous nations on earth, China and India? Generally speak-
ing we will be seeing 29–33 million young surplus males in China in twenty
years and 28–32 million young surplus males in India at that same time (see
Tables 4 and 5). (These are very conservative estimates, using birth sex ratios
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7. Ibid., p. 79.
8. Zeng Yi, Tu Ping, Gu Baochang, Xu Yi, Li Bohua, and Li Youngping, “Causes and Implications
of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China,” Population and Development Re-
view, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1993), p. 296.
that are lower than arguably should be used. For example, if the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Sciences’ ªgure of 120:100 male-to-female births were substi-
tuted, there would be closer to 40 million young surplus males in 2020 in
China.)
Who are these young surplus males? First, they are not equivalent to the
bachelors of the West. Single men in the West are not surplus males: Indeed
they can and often do form semipermanent attachments to women and pro-
duce children in that context. Surplus males, on the other hand, do not have
such possibilities. In a marriage market where women are scarce and thus able
to “marry up,” certain characteristics of young surplus males are easily and ac-
curately predicted. They are liable to come from the lowest socioeconomic
class, be un- or underemployed, live a fairly nomadic or transient lifestyle with
few ties to the communities in which they are working, and generally live and
socialize with other bachelors. In sum, these young surplus males may be con-
sidered, relatively speaking, losers in societal competition.
The behavior of young surplus males also follows a broadly predictable pat-
tern. Theory suggests that compared with other males in society, bare branches
will be prone to seek satisfaction through vice and violence, and will seek to
capture resources that will allow them to compete on a more equal footing
with others. These theoretical predictions are substantiated by empirical evi-
dence so vast and so compelling as to approach the status of social science
verity.9 Cross-culturally, an overwhelming percentage of violent crime is per-
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Table 4. Surplus Males, Aged 15–34, China.
Year Surplus Males Source of Information
1990 14,857,587 U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base
2020 29,207,874 Calculated using birth sex ratio of 111.3 for 1985–89;
118.2 for 1990–94; 115.4 for 1995–99; and 115.0 for
2000–04, with adjusted Life Table Survival Ratio (LTSR)
2020 33,059,694 Calculated as above, without adjusting LTSR
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base, IDB Aggregation, Table 094,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html/.
9. The literature here is immense. We cite only a few illustrative works: D. Benton, “Do Animal
Studies Tell Us Anything about the Relationships between Testosterone and Human Aggression?”
in Graham C.L. Davey, ed., Animal Models of Human Behavior (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, 1983),
pp. 281–298; Marie France Bouissou, “Androgens, Aggressive Behavior, and Social Relationships
in Higher Mammals,” Hormone Research, Vol. 18 (1983), pp. 43–61; John M.W. Bradford and
D. McLean, “Sexual Offenders, Violence, and Testosterone: A Clinical Study,” Canadian Journal of
petrated by young, unmarried, low-status males. As Margo Wilson and Martin
Daly note, “Men are not poorer than women, but they help themselves to other
people’s property more often, and they are evidently readier to use violence to
do so.”10
Some may question whether marital status plays an important role in such
behavioral dispositions, but this is another widely conªrmed research
ªnding.11 David Courtwright notes, “It is when young men cannot or do
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Table 5. Surplus Males, Aged 15–35, India.
Year Surplus Males Source of Information
1991 7,267,923 Census of India, 1991
2006 16,509,449 Calculated using Census of India, 1991
2020 28,326,000 Calculated using birth sex ratio of 109.65 M:F
2020 31,671.000 Calculated using birth sex ratio of 112.23 M:F
SOURCE: Office of the Registrar General, Census of India, 1991 (New Delhi, 1994).
Psychiatry, Vol. 29, No. 4 (June 1984), pp. 335–343; Kerrin Christiansen and Rainier Knussmann,
“Androgen Levels and Components of Aggressive Behavior in Men,” Hormones and Behavior, Vol.
21, No. 2 (June 1987), pp. 170–180; James M. Dabbs Jr. and Robin Morris, “Testosterone, Social
Class, and Antisocial Behavior in a Sample of 4,462 Men,” Psychological Science, Vol. 1 (1990),
pp. 209–211; Bruce B. Svare, ed., Hormones and Aggressive Behavior (New York: Plenum, 1983); Jane
Shibley Hyde, “Gender Differences in Aggression,” in Jane Shibley Hyde and Marcia C. Linn, eds.,
The Psychology of Gender: Advances through Meta-Analysis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1986); Kenneth E. Moyer, “Sex Differences in Aggression,” in Richard C. Friedman,
Ralph M. Richart, and Raymond L. Vande Wiele, eds., Sex Differences in Behavior (New York: Wiley,
1974), pp. 335–372; and Dolf Zillmann, Connections between Sex and Aggression (Hillsdale, N.J.:
Erlbaum, 1984).
Regarding the youthfulness of these aggressors, see, for example, Dan Olweus, Ake Mattsson,
Daisy Schalling, and Hans Loew, “Circulating Testosterone Levels and Aggression in Adolescent
Males: A Causal Analysis,” Psychosomatic Medicine, Vol. 50, No. 3 (May–June 1988), pp. 261–272;
Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, “Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male
Syndrome,” Ethology and Sociobiology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1985), pp. 59–73; Derral Cheatwood and
Kathleen J. Block, “Youth and Homicide,” Justice Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1990), pp. 265–292; and
Christian G. Mesquida and Neil I. Wiener, “Human Collective Aggression: A Behavioral Ecology
Perspective,” Ethology and Sociobiology, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1996), pp. 247–262. The vast majority of ho-
micides are committed by males aged 15–35. Within that age group, males aged 20–29 commit
most of the homicides. See Wilson and Daly, “Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence.”
10. Wilson and Daly, “Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence,” p. 66.
11. See Mesquida and Wiener, “Human Collective Aggression”; Martin Daly and Margo Wilson,
Sex, Evolution, and Behavior (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978); David T. Courtwright, Vi-
olent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to the Inner City (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1996); Theodore D. Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of
the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Robert Wright, The
Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon, 1994); Laura Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduc-
tion: A Cross-Cultural Correlation of Conºict Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and Degree of Polygyny,”
not marry that socially disruptive behavior is intensiªed.”12 Robert Wright
explains:
An unmarried man between 24 and 35 years of age is about three times as
likely to murder another male as is a married man the same age. Some of this
difference no doubt reºects the kinds of men that do and don’t get married to
begin with, but . . . a good part of the difference may lie in “the pacifying ef-
fect” of marriage. Murder isn’t the only thing an “unpaciªed” man is more
likely to do. He is also more likely to incur various risks—committing robbery,
for example—to gain the resources that may attract women. He is more likely
to rape. Abuse of drugs and alcohol . . . compound the problem by further di-
minishing his chances of ever earning enough money to attract women by le-
gitimate means.13
Why should this be so? Allan Mazur and his coauthors have determined
that T (serum testosterone) levels in men who court and then marry drop rela-
tive to men who do not: “T levels fall during the years surrounding marriage.
Changing T levels may explain the low criminality found among married
men. . . . Married men, living stably with their wives, are less prone to crime
than unmarried men. Married men are less likely than single men of the same
age to kill an unrelated male.”14 According to Mazur, T has been found to be
signiªcantly related to a variety of antisocial behaviors, including trouble with
the law, alcohol and substance abuse, violent behavior, and other types of re-
bellion and rule breaking. When T falls, so does the propensity to engage in
these behaviors.15 According to Mazur’s analysis, the more men in the society
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Ethology and Sociobiology, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1982), pp. 209–221; Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homi-
cide (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988); Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, “Killing the
Competition: Female/Female and Male/Male Homicide,” Human Nature, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990),
pp. 81–107; Napoleon Chagnon, “Is Reproductive Success Equal in Egalitarian Societies?” in
Chagnon and William Irons, eds., Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropologi-
cal Perspective (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979); David Buss, The Evolution of Desire:
Strategies of Human Mating (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Frank A. Pedersen, “Secular Trends in
Human Sex Ratios: Their Inºuence on Individual and Family Behavior,” Human Nature, Vol. 2, No.
3 (1991), pp. 271–291; and Randy Thornhill and Nancy Thornhill, “Human Rape: An Evolutionary
Analysis,” Ethology and Sociobiology, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1983), pp. 137–173.
12. Courtwright, Violent Land, p. 202.
13. Wright, The Moral Animal, p. 100.
14. Allan Mazur and Joel Michalek, “Marriage, Divorce, and Male Testosterone,” Social Forces, Vol.
77, No. 1 (September 1998), p. 1.
15. See Allan Mazur and Alan Booth, “Testosterone and Dominance in Men,” Behavioral and Brain
Science, Vol. 21, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 353–397. There have been numerous debates over the effects
of testosterone on behavior. Some suggest that it is testosterone’s transformation into estradiol that
provides these effects. Others dispute that any effect exists at all. See, for example, David France,
“Testosterone, the Rogue Hormone, Is Getting a Makeover,” New York Times, February 17, 1999,
p. G3.
who are unable to marry, even though they would be willing to marry, the
higher their circulating T and the greater amount of antisocial, violent, and
criminal behavior they will exhibit, generally speaking, than if they were able
to marry.
When bare branches congregate, the potential for more organized aggression
increases substantially. For example, experiments have shown that the “risky
shift” is more pronounced in groups of males than in groups of females.16 The
advocacy of risky choices by men in group situations appears to enhance their
social prestige. As Courtwright puts it, “Men who congregate with men tend
to be more sensitive about status and reputation. Even if they are not intoxi-
cated with drink or enraged by insult, they instinctively test one another, prob-
ing for signs of weakness. . . . Disreputable, lower-class males . . . exercised
much greater inºuence in bachelor communities like bunkhouses and mining
camps. They both tempted and punished, for to fail to emulate their vices was
to fail, in their own terms, to be a man.”17
In this “least common denominator” theory, the behavior of men in groups
—most particularly young, single, low-status males—will not rise above the
behavior of the worst-behaved individual. Together, they will take larger risks
and be more violent than they otherwise would individually.
The sheer number of bare branches, coupled with the distinctive outcast
subculture that binds them together and their lack of “stake” in the existing so-
cial order, predispose them to organized social banditry. The potential for
intrasocietal violence is increased when society selects for bare branches, as
certain Asian societies do. It is possible that this intrasocietal violence may
have intersocietal consequences as well.
It is important to note that we are not claiming that the presence of
signiªcant numbers of bare branches causes violence; violence can be found in
all societies, regardless of sex ratio. Indeed, to give but one example, the sex ra-
tio of Rwanda in 1994 was normal. Rather the opportunity for such violence to
emerge and become relatively large-scale is heightened by socially prevalent
selection for bare branches. We see this factor as having an amplifying or ag-
gravating effect. To use a natural metaphor, the presence of dry, bare branches
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16. Norris R. Johnson, James G. Stemler, and Deborah Hunter, “Crowd Behavior as “Risky Shift”:
A Laboratory Experiment,” Sociometry, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1977), pp. 183–187. Playing off Irving
Janis’s seminal work on groupthink, it has been noted that individuals in a cohesive group take
greater risks than any one of them would individually. This has been repeatedly conªrmed in ex-
perimental research.
17. Courtwright, Violent Land, pp. 42–43.
cannot cause ªre in and of itself, but when the sparks begin to ºy, those bare
branches provide kindling sufªcient to turn the sparks into a ªre larger and
more dangerous than otherwise.
Three Illustrative Historical Cases
One useful way of examining this relationship between young adult surplus
males and societal violence is to see how it developed in certain historical epi-
sodes where the presence of large numbers of young surplus males can be doc-
umented. The cases that follow are meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive, for
we are not historians. However, because historians generally have not
classiªed social conºict according to the involvement of bare branches, we
have had to probe source material ourselves to detect their presence.
the nien rebellion
The Nien Rebellion of 1851–63, ªnally quelled in 1868, originated with an orga-
nized group of bandits from the poor area of Huai-pei in northern China.18
This region has a very harsh environment, and during the ªrst half of the nine-
teenth century, experienced ºood, drought, or locust invasion on an average of
every three to four years. Many died of starvation. The response of the people
of Huai-pei to this period of famine and stress was female infanticide. Nine-
teenth-century statistics for the Huai-pei region reveal that there was an over-
all average of 129 men for every 100 women,19 an extremely high sex ratio.
A signiªcant number of Huai-pei males may have gone unmarried and had
no hope of marrying. The best scholarly estimates suggest that in this period,
“poorer men had to delay their marriages by six years in comparison with
richer men, and that twenty-ªve percent of men were unable to marry at all.”20 This
accords with estimates of female infanticide in the late imperial period reach-
ing levels of approximately 300 per 1,000.21 James Lee and Wang Feng concur:
“Among peasant families in north-eastern China in the century after 1774, be-
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18. This account of the Nien is adapted from the work of Elizabeth Perry, speciªcally Perry, Rebels
and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980).
19. Ibid., p. 51. For purposes of comparison, the sex ratio in Dodge City, Kansas, in 1880 was
“only” 124. Courtwright, Violent Land, p. 58.
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tween one-ªfth and one-quarter of all females were killed as children.”22 The
scarcity of marriageable women was deepened by polygamy and concubinage
practiced by rich men, present in an estimated 10 percent of Chinese marriages
of the period.23 Although individual peasant families were pursuing a rational
policy in preferring to rear sons who were expected to augment household in-
come, the social impact of this policy was a serious surplus of poor, young sin-
gle males. As one scholar explains, “Families adopted the practice of female
infanticide to increase family income and security, but the long-term aggregate
result was a skewed demography in which there was a large surplus of young
men. These young men became natural recruits for bandit gangs and local mi-
litia—thus providing resources for the emergence of collective strategies of
predation and protection.”24
These were the young men dubbed the “bare sticks” or “bare branches” be-
cause they would not have families: Their parents had killed the girls who
should have grown up to be their wives. One Chinese ofªcial, Chen Sheng-
shao, wrote in 1827, “Since marrying off women is hard, people raise few
women. Since affording to marry is difªcult, there are many bachelors.”25 Chen
goes on to note that it was the high price of marriage that led “homeless ban-
dits” to “kidnap, steal, and feud.”26
James Watson of Harvard University and David Ownby of the University
of Montreal have both articulated the link between permanent, involuntary
bachelorhood caused by high sex ratios and violence in historical China. Wat-
son coined the phrase “bachelor subculture” to help explain how antisocial
behavior becomes the norm for these men. Ownby explains that “in the eyes
of most Chinese an unmarried man is not truly an adult, not truly a man.”27
He suggests that the theory of “protest masculinity,” wherein men unable
to fulªll gender expectations are driven toward “hypermasculine displays
in order to prove to others, as well as to themselves, that they are indeed “real
men,” may apply.28 Watson provides evidence for this linkage in a study of
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militias composed, he ªnds, of almost exclusively bare branches. He explains
that
A strategy that [bare branches] sometimes use to enhance their male image is
to make a regular practice of challenging the public face of other men. Face is
essentially an attribute of married men who have families to protect and obli-
gations to fulªll. Unmarried men have little face to preserve because they do
not command much respect in the community. . . . By deªnition, therefore,
bachelors remain perpetual adolescents who cannot play a full role in society.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion an unmarried youth can have no
face and is therefore dangerous. . . . These “bare sticks” had nothing to lose ex-
cept their reputations for violence.29
Ownby points out that the term “bare branches or “bare sticks” “refers to
both violent, petty criminals as well as to bachelors” and quotes a nineteenth-
century Western missionary as describing the “sublime ideal” of the “bare
sticks” as making it “a sport and a matter of pride to defy the laws and the
magistrates, and commit all kinds of crimes. To give and receive wounds with
composure; to kill others with the most perfect coolness; and to have no fear of
death for yourself.”30 Ownby goes on to suggest that most bandits in historical
China were, in fact, bare branches. Watson details that most bare branches in
his study were semiliterate and were third, fourth, or ªfth sons whose families
were too poor to offer them an inheritance. In many cases, these noninheriting
sons were “pushed out” (tuei chu) of their fathers’ houses in their teens, and
came to live in bachelor houses with groups of other unmarried youths.31 In
their early twenties, they would move out of the bachelor house and in with a
collective of men—a dormitory of workers, a monastery or religious brother-
hood, or the local militia. In each case, they would spend much of their leisure
time learning and practicing the martial arts. These collectives, whatever their
character, often led to the formation of bandit gangs, by means of which bare
branches could gain a measure of face and wealth that would otherwise be un-
obtainable in a society where marriage was the mark of maturity.
In the case of the bare branches of Huai-pei born in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, not only were these young men never going to settle down, but most of
them were not able to secure labor. Eventually, enough of these “rational bach-
elors” began to view banditry as an alternative lifestyle that would enable
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them to contribute to family income.32 They started as salt smugglers, an activ-
ity made proªtable because of the high tax placed by the government on salt.
In 1815 a county magistrate classiªed the troublemakers of the area into three
categories: bare sticks, smugglers, and bandits. The overlap between the three
groups was great.33 One commentator noted, “They do not fear the imperial
laws, nor do they submit to the discipline of their fathers or elder brothers.”34
Initially these bandits were not out to topple the Qing dynasty; they were
just looting to make a living. They began as small, autonomous groups but
eventually organized. Li Ji notes, “In 1855, most of the ‘Nien Zi’ met at Zhi Heji
(a small county in An Hui province) and united to form a powerful armed
force—’Nien Jun.’ The goal of the army was to overthrow the Qing Dynasty.”35
The Nien grew in inºuence, and their threat expanded. At the peak of the re-
bellion, as many as 100,000 bare sticks were participants. Active in Hupeh,
Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, and Anhui regions, the Nien became very power-
ful. In 1862 the governor of Anhui “reported that there were at least two thou-
sand Nien forts in Huai-pei, each with one to three thousand inhabitants. The
Nien apparently were in at least nominal control of a population of some two
to six million people.”36 The imperial government was compelled to adopt for-
eign arms and modernize its army along Western lines, which allowed the
army to ªnally gain the advantage and defeat the Nien over a period of several
years ending in 1868.
An interesting resemblance of modern China to the era of the Nien is a con-
temporary echo of the Chinese ofªcial noted above who stated in 1815 that the
social problems of his area stemmed from bare sticks, smugglers, and bandits.
Recent analysis notes, “According to ªgures from authoritative departments,
China has an indigent population of 80 million, a migrant population of
80 million, and will soon have 80 million single men.”37 Our analysis tells us
that the overlap between these three populations is very large. China is re-
creating the vast army of bare sticks that plagued it during the nineteenth
century.
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medieval portugal
Though medieval Portugal contained certain causal factors not present in
China or India,38 James Boone’s case study demonstrates that when govern-
ments become aware of the bare branch threat, they consciously seek to mini-
mize that threat through foreign policy initiatives.39
Medieval Portugal invested heavily in ªrstborn sons to maintain familial ac-
cumulation of resources over generations. It comes as no surprise, then, that
the adult sex ratio of the time was approximately 112:100. In addition to low-
status bare branches, the case of medieval Portugal is interesting because it
also had high-status bare branches—second-, third- and higher-birth-order sons
of nobility (“cadet sons”) who could not inherit, and thus could not marry.
As Boone notes, this conºuence of factors bred extreme political instability
for Portugal; the cadet sons and the lower-class bare branches began to band
together in small armies. These bare-branch bands affected governmental pol-
icy in two ways: (1) in times of political upheaval, they generally backed—
by force of arms—usurpers who promised to redistribute societal resources
in their favor; and (2) in less turbulent times, the government consciously
pursued policies to disperse them to foreign lands, usually in causes of expan-
sionist warfare and colonization. Boone cites the case of Joao I, the illegitimate
half-brother of a Portuguese monarch, who took the throne after the monarch’s
death with the help of the cadet sons and their bare-branch bands. But then
Joao I discovered that the piracy and robbery they caused threatened his own
monarchy. Having obtained Papal consent, and at great cost and deªcit, Joao I
sponsored the Reconquista—an attack on the North African coast. Boone cites
another scholar working from primary sources: “It was above all the cadets,
who lacked land and other sources of revenue within the country who desired
war, which would permit them to accede to a situation of social and material
independence.”40 Indeed Georges Duby notes, “It is obvious that it was the
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bands of ‘youths’ excluded by so many social prohibitions from the main body
of settled men, fathers of families and heads of houses, with their prolonged
spells of turbulent behavior making them an unstable fringe of society, who
created and sustained the crusades.”41
The expansionist strategy worked, to a certain extent. Boone notes that by
the mid-sixteenth century, almost 25 percent of adult noble males would die in
expansionist or civil warfare. It may be useful, however, to step back and con-
template the signiªcant cost to society and government of creating the bare
branches in the ªrst place. Political turbulence was continual, the drain on the
economy due to the required expansionist warfare was seriously detrimental
to both the government and the population in general, and the loss of life and
property due to the bare branch bands (and the loss of life of the bare branches
themselves) was considerable. The reproductive strategy chosen—that of high
sex ratio—coupled with primogeniture ensured, in Boone’s words, “political
instability, warfare, and territorial expansion.”42
martial religious brotherhoods in historical china
In Western society, monks of centuries past are stereotypically viewed as hav-
ing been peaceful, generally older men who spent their time engaged in good
works, or perhaps copying manuscripts. In Chinese history, monks were very
much involved in worldly affairs. Indeed the life course of “monk” or “reli-
gious zealot” was one means by which bare-branch youths could seek to raise
their status in society. This choice of vocation did not necessarily preclude con-
tinuance of what we have recognized as typical bare-branch behavior.43 To be
more speciªc, martial prowess and the amassing of unearned wealth were not
infrequently associated with some monasteries and other quasi-religious
brotherhoods, and this had political ramiªcations.
Probably the most famous example is the Shaolin ªghting monks, who, hav-
ing saved the life of the emperor Tai Tsung in the Tang era, were given land to
build a monastery that eventually housed 2,500 martial monks. But later in
Chinese history, the power of monasteries would grow, especially Buddhist
monasteries favored by the powerful eunuchs. In the late a.d. 800s, ofªcial
ªgures show “over a quarter of a million monastics, who controlled some 4,600
monasteries, 40,000 pagodas, and untold thousands of temples, including
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slaves and attendants, much of the nation’s best lands, and much wealth, all
existing tax free.”44 By the late 1400s, there were more than 1.5 million monks,
with one ofªcial calculating that the rice needed to feed them all “could easily
supply the entire capital population for over one year.”45 David Robinson has
found participation of martial monks as mercenaries in quelling rebellions
alongside imperial troops throughout the sixteenth century.46
Monastic orders coexisted with more heterodox quasi-religious brother-
hoods, many of them secret. The migratory ºuidity induced by hardship and
lack of opportunity led many young men, typically bare branches of Watson’s
“bachelor subculture,” to the ranks of these brotherhoods.47 Fei-ling Davis
identiªes those likely to belong to secret brotherhoods as dispossessed peas-
ants, unemployed artisans, laborers and porters, disbanded soldiers, smug-
glers, and victims of disasters, all of whom came to be known as the “ºoating
population” (you-min) due to their mobility and their poverty.48
Sometimes the practice of martial arts was an explicit element of these secret
brotherhoods. Indeed boxing exhibitions were a primary way to seek recruits.
Once a young man expressed a desire to become a pupil of the boxing instruc-
tor, he would be carefully groomed to become a member of the society itself.
The poorer the area, the more likely young male devotees would be found. In
the late 1800s, a letter by a former magistrate noted, “The road passed through
Chiping. The area is bitterly poor, but in hundreds of villages they are studying
United-in-Righteousness Boxing.”49 According to chroniclers of the time, we
can identify some hallmarks of bare-branch behavior among these boxing en-
thusiasts: “In this area there are many vagabonds and rowdies (wu-lai gun-tu)
who draw their swords and gather crowds. They have established societies of
various names: the Obedient Swords (Shun-dao hui), Tiger-tail Whip (Hu-wei
bian), the Yi-he Boxers, and Eight Trigrams sect (Ba-gua jiao). They are over-
bearing in the villages and oppress the good people.”50
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Occasionally, members of these secret brotherhoods became bandits and re-
bels. In 1898 the governor of Shandong reported, “This year the spring rains
were late and the grain prices rose. In addition it was a time of troop reduction
and consolidation. Dispersed braves and habitual outlaws from else-
where . . . combined with unemployed vagrants into a mob of several hun-
dreds. . . . Armed with foreign riºes and weapons, they plundered neighboring
villages on the pretext of borrowing grain, and extorted horses, weapons, and
ammunition.”51 Another contemporary commentator noted, “In the provinces
of Chihli, Honan, and Shantung, chiao-fei [religious bandits] spread their creeds
one to another. . . . Once famine occurs they, relying on their numerical
strength, plunder collectively in broad daylight, calling their marauding activi-
ties ‘equalizing the food.’”52 We propose that several major rebellions might
usefully be investigated to assess the role of bare branches, including the Eight
Trigrams Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Black Flag Army’s activities.
Sometimes the fate of these rebellious bare branches was not eventual defeat
and violent death, but rather astounding success. Taizu, the Grand Progenitor
of the Ming dynasty had, for most of his life, been “a vagrant, a beggar, a mem-
ber of a millenarian sect, and a rebel.”53 After the Ming slashed the number of
government employees in 1629, “Li Zicheng, who eventually emerged as the
rebel leader who drove the Ming from Beijing, was among those unemployed
workers who threw his lot in with the rebels.”54 Throughout Chinese history, a
standing pool of marginal men were available for violent work, and they
sometimes changed the destiny of the nation. According to Gensho Nishimara,
most of this pool were wulai, meaning young male “ºoaters” who prided
themselves on being “tough.”55 Ueda Makato calls the wulai urban vagabonds
who depended on violence to make a living, often forming “enforcers
guilds.”56 In the Ming, government reports blamed much of the crime in
Beijing on the “unregistered ones”—gangs made up of bare sticks, whose
members were called “ªerce tigers.”57 The fate of these criminals was not al-
ways bleak. For example, according to Ownby, the common folk saying “If you
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want to become an ofªcial, carry a big stick” has reference to the traditional
practice of awarding the bandits with ofªcial posts as a means of co-opting
them.58
Martial ethos, poverty, mobility, anonymity, and congregation with other
young bachelors in a similar situation—these common attributes were found
in those who made up the backbone of Chinese brotherhoods. As Ownby
notes, “Secret societies were reinterpreted by scholars in the 1970s and 1980s as
marginal, frequently criminal gangs, little different from ‘pure’ bandits as we
usually think of them. . . . Other bandit gangs, whether they qualify as secret
societies or not (the distinction is a ªne one in many cases), engaged in reli-
gious practices as well, . . . [such as] initiation ceremonies and invulnerability
rituals.”59 These brotherhoods, whether orthodox or heterodox, were to pose
grave security problems for the central government. As one seventeenth-
century commentator put it, “Heretical teachings start by inciting, deluding,
and gathering people, but end by planning rebellion.”60 Given the high sex ra-
tios of its society, perhaps the grave suspicion with which the current Chinese
government views movements such as the Falun Gong is not entirely un-
founded in light of this history.
In conclusion, there is both strong theory and persuasive historical evidence
that the bare branches of high sex-ratio societies can contribute signiªcantly to
intrasocietal violence. In some cases, this domestic threat has led governments
to create foreign policy initiatives designed to disperse bare branches. The
strategies that bare branches choose to better their position in society erode the
stability of the societies in which they live. As we have seen, governments do
become aware of the potentially violent dynamics of their high sex-ratio popu-
lations and struggle, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully—
but always at great cost—to implement policies to counteract the destabi-
lization caused.
The Security Logic of High Sex-Ratio Societies
The repercussions of artiªcially high sex ratios pose grave problems of insecu-
rity for a society which, in turn, create vexing policy dilemmas for govern-
International Security 26:4 24
58. Ownby, “Approximations of Chinese Bandits,” p. 18.
59. Ibid. Indeed Ownby goes on to note that during the civil war, both national and communist
forces courted bandits, with communists being willing to swear “blood oaths and pretend[ing] to
adopt bandit/secret society codes of brotherhood and loyalty—attempting, of course, to assimilate
such values to Leninist discipline.”
60. Quoted in Barend J. ter Harr, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History (Leiden, the
Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1992), p. 237.
ments. As Boone puts it, “Reproductive strategies have an important effect on
the development of state political organization, and . . . there is a fundamental
contradiction between individual (or familial) reproductive interests and the
social reproduction of the state political structure.”61 It is to these issues that
we now turn.
state political organization in high sex-ratio societies
High sex-ratio societies will tend to develop authoritarian political systems
over time, for these are better equipped to deal with possible large-scale
intrasocietal violence created by society’s selection for bare branches. As Chris-
tian Mesquida and Neil Weiner note, “Choice of political system made by the
members of a population is somewhat restricted by the age composition of its
male population.”62 Robert Wright is even more blunt: “Few things are more
anxiety-producing for an elite governing class than gobs of [unmarried] and
childless men with at least a modicum of political power. . . . Extreme
polygyny [which is the functional equivalent of a high sex ratio] often goes
hand in hand with extreme political hierarchy, and reaches its zenith under the
most despotic regimes. . . . Leaving lots of men without wives is not just
inegalitarian: it’s dangerous. . . . A nation, in which large numbers of low-
income men remain mateless, is not the kind of country many of us would
want to live in.”63
If Wright, Boone, Mesquida, and Wiener are right, then we can expect high
sex-ratio societies to be governable only by authoritarian regimes.64 Indeed, in
an intriguing empirical study of 186 societies, Laura Betzig ªnds the correla-
tion between despotism and polygyny to be 0.72, signiªcant at the 0.01 level.65
Though analysts have high hopes for increasing democratization in such na-
tions as China, India, and Pakistan, we would argue that the longer-term pros-
pects are not good when gender elements of security are factored in. These are
traditionally high sex-ratio societies whose birth sex ratios have undergone a
strikingly upward climb since approximately 1985 when prenatal sex-selection
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techniques became widely available. Fortunately for the case of South Korea,
stringent enforcement of anti-sex-selective abortion laws since identiªcation of
the problem in the early 1990s has led to a much improved sex ratio, hopefully
auguring well for the continuance of democracy in that country. Speaking
more generally about Asia, however, we are on the cusp of the time period
wherein these larger proportions of bare branches will become socially active.
As they do, we believe that governments in such societies will begin their pre-
dicted shift toward greater authoritarianism. In countries with high sex-ratio
societies that are not ethnically homogeneous, such as India, this shift may
start as rule by the majority ethnic group which group will, in turn, actually
promote interethnic violence.
Indeed, governments of high sex-ratio societies must often cultivate a politi-
cal style crafted to retain the allegiance and respect of its bare branches. This
tends to be a swaggering, belligerent, provocative, martial style—to match that
of the bare branches themselves. In the rhetoric accompanying such a posture,
there is inevitably an “other,” who is weak and contemptible and whose at-
tempt to ªnd a place in society or in the international order must be opposed.
The society is then enjoined to muster its strength so that these “insults” can be
answered with appropriate action. Though all governments at one time or an-
other may engage in these types of tactics, they take on a particular urgency for
governments of high sex-ratio societies. These governments understand that
its bare branches are a formidable club—if it is in your hand it can be very use-
ful, but if it is poised over your head, it may constitute a greater threat than ex-
ternal enemies.
strategies for controlling intrasocietal violence in high sex-ratio
societies
There is only one short-term strategy for dealing with a serious bare-branch
problem: Reduce their numbers. There are several traditional ways to do so:
Fight them, encourage their self-destruction, or export them. Longer-range
strategies to address the problem, such as decreasing offspring sex selection,
are also viable (and laudable), but are not likely to improve the government’s
situation for a generation or more. Furthermore, though economic prosperity
is useful in placating disgruntled members of society, including bare branches,
no amount of wealth will turn surplus males into nonsurplus males. At most,
it can only rearrange which males end up at the bottom of the hypergynous
heap. (Hypergyny is the practice of brides marrying upward in social class,
which inevitably leaves lowest-class men without wives.) Prosperity is thus no
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panacea in this situation, though economic downturns are likely to trigger vio-
lent resource capture by bare branches.
Governments will always seek to suppress societal violence that threatens
their authority. Indeed the government may actually recruit bare branches into
military or police units that are used to ªght bare-branch criminals. As we
have shown in the historical studies, however, signiªcant societal dislocation
may be caused by large-scale suppression tactics.
Another approach is to simply let bare branches destroy each other, either
turning a blind eye when rivals dispatch one another or encouraging ethnic di-
visions that will lead to intergroup violence. Once again, however, the level of
societal dislocation may in the end threaten the government, as it will appear
that the government has lost control over the level of violence in society. A sec-
ond variant of this strategy is to provide large, dangerous public works that
pay well. Building intercontinental railways or huge new dams, reclaiming
vast tracts of swampland or desert—if done the old-fashioned way using pri-
marily manual labor—can both occupy and sustain bare branches, while also
ensuring signiªcantly increased mortality among that population subgroup.
Nevertheless, there may be a limit to how many such works can be undertaken
by a given society.
Finally, governments seek to send bare branches elsewhere. “Elsewhere,” in
the government’s perspective, may include distant frontier regions of the
country or may in fact be other countries. This may be a peaceful export of col-
onists to a frontier or an exodus of migrant workers to other nations. There is,
however, a martial variant of this strategy as well: a strategy that has been con-
sciously used in history to reduce bare-branch numbers. If the bare branches
threaten national security if they live at home, the government may prefer to
let them die in some glorious national cause far from home instead. As Boone
puts it, “Many males at the lower end of the scale lead lives of enforced celi-
bacy in what for them is a seller’s market and are furthermore engaged in pro-
duction, construction, and military occupations that tend to raise their
mortality rates through occupational hazards and unhealthful conditions.
Their poor socioeconomic position and reproductive prospects make them pe-
rennial aspirants in large-scale expansionist and insurgent military campaigns
through which they might hope to achieve higher positions.”66 Mesquida and
Weiner have recently put some empirical ºesh on these propositions. In their
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examination of collective violence in human societies, they report, “Our analy-
ses of interstate and intrastate episodes of collective aggression since the 1960s
indicate the existence of a consistent correlation between the ratio of males 15
to 29 years of age per 100 males 30 years of age and older, and the level of
coalitional aggression as measured by the number of reported conºict related
deaths.”67 They go on to explain:
Young males participate in collective aggression to acquire the resources
needed to attract a mate, and we should expect a great majority of the militants
to come from that section of the population with fewest resources. . . . It is
likely then that controlling elites astutely underwrite such risky undertakings
as territorial expansion or colonization, especially when the alternative is hav-
ing the aggressive tendencies of the male citizens directed at them-
selves. . . . Tentatively, we would like to propose that this intergenerational
competition for reproductive resources, when exacerbated by the presence of a
relatively large number of resourceless young males, might result in the emer-
gence of male collective aggression, which occasionally expresses itself as ex-
pansionist warfare. . . . The presence of a relatively large number of young men
makes coalitional aggression more probable, particularly when resources
needed to attract a mate are insufªciently available or poorly distributed.68
Boone suggests that in medieval Portugal, the presence of signiªcant num-
bers of bare branches (“cadet males”) necessitated territorial expansion by the
state. He documents the creation of “a highly competitive, volatile situation at
the societal level with respect to the problem of excess cadet males. Rulers
must choose between dispersing these individuals, for example, in expansion-
ist campaigns, or facing disorder and overthrow on the home front.”69 Further-
more, “territorial expansion does not necessarily arise as an adaptive response
on the part of a polity to expand its resource base or to solve productive
deªciencies facing the population at large: expansionist warfare often results
from attempts by individuals or coalitions to maintain control by directing the
competition of their immediate subordinates away from themselves and
against neighboring territories. These strategies . . . may be maintained at a
considerable resource deªcit seen from the point of view of the general popu-
lation.”70 In sum, insights from theory and history portend that the increasing
skewness of Asia’s sex ratios mitigate against both democracy and peace in
that region.
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The Bare Branches of Today’s Asia
Because prenatal offspring sex selection only became widely prevalent from
about 1985, we currently stand at the threshold of time in which bare branches
will come to represent a greater proportion of the population in certain Asian
societies than heretofore, and become a signiªcant factor in contemporary gov-
ernmental calculations. Nevertheless, there are signs that our expectations re-
garding the societal instability to be created by increasing numbers of surplus
males are already beginning to be fulªlled.
china
About 97 percent of all unmarried persons aged 28–49 in China are male.71
Data show that approximately 74 percent of unmarried males failed to gradu-
ate from high school.72 About 97 percent of rural unmarried males did not
graduate from high school, and about 40 percent are illiterate.73 Ye Wenzhen
and Lin Qingguo note the predictably hypergynous result, “The existence of
lots of unmarried men after marriage age should attribute to the rational ‘mar-
rying up’ of women at marriage age, and the relatively low social-economic
situation of the unmarried men.”74
Chinese transients are overwhelmingly young and male and of low status,
and they do tend to congregate. Though we do not have data on marital status
of transients, we assert that when data are collected on the subject, it will be
found that most are unmarried. Reliable estimates indicate that in the liudong
renkou (the “ºoating population”) of 100–150 million persons, 80 percent are
under age 35 and about 72–75 percent are male.75 One 1993 sample ªnds 81.8
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percent of migrants to be male.76 The ºoating population is expected to sur-
pass 200 million persons in the next decade.77
The transients have not been smoothly integrated into urban life, and they
do tend to congregate for social support. Inside China Mainland reports that
“the increase in migrants has placed an added burden on already overloaded
city infrastructures. On the outskirts of major towns, unplanned settlements
have sprung up, where not only is public order and safety a problem, but
where counterfeit goods and pornography are produced, and where the sex
trade is prominent.”78 The periodical goes on to note that “over two million
migrants are living in that nation’s train stations, warehouses and along the
tracks.”79 We assert that these are probably bachelor subculture communities.
Transient workers ªnd bewildering differences when they ªrst come to cities,
“often experiencing disdain or exclusion from urbanites.”80
The development of a large ºoating population was always a harbinger of
increasing social unrest in historical China. The ranks of the “ºoating people”
(liu min) were full of the poor, the unemployed, and the vagrant, all of whom
were noted to be prone to violence. Indeed a common governmental reaction
to this phenomenon throughout history was periodic registration drives, in
which ºoaters would be registered and placed in an administration unit,
where they would be under the daily supervision of a government employee.
This response, dating back at least four or ªve centuries,81 has recently been
adopted by the current government, which is also demolishing unlicensed
markets and migrant housing and placing strict limits on the number of regis-
tered migrants a company can hire. Beijing authorities recently enunciated the
goal of reducing legal migrants by at least 15 percent, while hoping to slash il-
legal migration.82
Given that the 100–150 million ºoating population of China is overwhelm-
ingly young, male, and low status—characteristics that we have demonstrated
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to be hallmarks of bare branches—can the typical bare-branch behavioral
syndrome be found among China’s ºoaters? The answer is an unequivocal
yes.
Though crime data for China are very sketchy, and statistics vary from
source to source, a clear pattern begins to emerge: Migrants are responsible for
an inordinate amount of crime in China today. According to one source, in eco-
nomically developed regions, migrants account for more than 50 percent of all
arrests. “In the Jingdiao area of Shanghai’s Pudong region, . . . migrants now
account for over 90 percent of crimes, compared to 30 percent in 1990.” The
same source notes that “among all cases solved by railway authorities in 1994
concerning criminal acts and public order, 82 percent were committed by mi-
grants, while 69% of criminals apprehended were migrants.”83 Beijing Review
reports that “outsiders were responsible for 80 percent of criminal offenses in
the capital. Similarly, it was found that 80 percent of the people arrested in
the southern Pearl River delta and other coastal regions came from other
provinces.”84
Duan Chengyang reports, “In 1994, . . . the rate of committing crime among
the rural migrant laborers was 1.3 percent, which was four times the national
average. In Shanghai, Beijing, and other very large cities, the criminal cases
committed by the rural migrant laborers accounted for more than half of the
total criminal cases in these cities. Guangzhou even reached 80 percent.”85 Yet
another scholar indicates that migrants “are said to be responsible for between
one-third to 70 percent of all criminal activities in Chinese cities, with offenses
ranging from theft, robbery, prostitution, to drug peddling, extortion, and mur-
der.” Other sources estimate that migrants account for 90 percent of criminals
in Hangzhou.86 Zhang Haiyang notes, “Generally speaking, the rural laborers
are less educated, are extremely heterogeneous in composition, and lack the
sense of law. When their requests cannot be satisªed, they tend to commit
crimes.”87
Yingyi Situ and Liu Weizheng, comparative criminologists, provide the fol-
lowing analysis and statistics:
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The inºux of rural people has caused a variety of problems for the cities. Be-
sides the extreme pressure derived from the shortage of living space, transpor-
tation, water, electricity, and gas supplies, the worst problem is crime.
According to recent statistics from the Administers of Public Security, 569,000
of the offenders arrested by the police in 1994 were transient people. In Beijing,
44% of the crimes solved by the police were committed by transients. In Shang-
hai, this rate has been continually rising from 10% in the mid-1980s to 60%,
even 80% in some districts, by 1995. In Xiamen, 62% of the crimes in general,
and 82% of the felonies, were committed by transients. In Guangdong prov-
ince, 90% of the prostitutes and drug trafªckers were temporary residents. Bur-
glary was the most serious crime in Guangzhou city in 1994, with 80% of it
being committed by transients. Apparently, whereas the regular city residents
are responsible for a portion of the crimes, the new migrants constitute a large
majority of the problem in the major Chinese cities. Moreover, our study found
that many crimes committed by transient people are senseless and ruthless. An
argument over a word can lead to a cold-blooded ªght; burglars often kill the
victims or witnesses on the scene if the offense is observed; highway robbery,
rape, and kidnapping usually end with the victims’ death; and a complaint
about the poor quality of goods sold by transient vendors can cause injury in a
severe physical assault.88
Notable is the speciªc mention of details so characteristic of bare-branch be-
havior: senseless, ruthless violence over words, insults, and injured pride.
Other rebellious activity has been noted as well. One source notes that in
1996 there were 12,000 labor strikes and protests, mostly carried out by mi-
grant workers with grievances over pay.89 The 2001 entry of China into the
World Trade Organization is thus a double-edged sword. On the one hand, en-
try into the WTO is liable to facilitate long-term Chinese prosperity. On the
other hand, the concessions made by China will fall heavily on workers in both
agriculture and heavy industry. Chi Lo, a senior Asian economist based in
Hong Kong, expects urban employment to double as a result.90 And another
study suggests, “Millions of farmers . . . would have to leave their homes and
ªnd new jobs in urban areas.”91 One anonymous Western economist predicted
a “blood bath” for Chinese farmers as a result of China’s accession to the
WTO.92 It is important to remember that these two groups—farmers and
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heavy-industry workers—are groups with a heavy representation of bare
branches. What WTO accession means for China, then, is that more bare
branches will join the ranks of the unemployed. In the short term, then, the po-
tential for instability may be worse than economists estimate. We hope it is not
worse than the Chinese government estimates. Indeed we could not help but
note that press reports indicate that one major source of recruits for the Falun
Gong is the unemployed.93
Observers of the larger picture seem intuitively aware of the propensities of
bare-branch syndrome behavior to disrupt society. One source refers to the mi-
grant workers as “a volatile social factor,” another asserting that “the challenge
facing Chinese ofªcials—central, provincial and urban alike—is to keep this gi-
ant [migrant] work force happy, or at least satisªed with their lot. If they fail,
public order will deteriorate as restless migrants tire of being treated as sec-
ond-class citizens.”94 This deterioration is reºected in the fact that crime in
China is increasing signiªcantly over time. In 1998, criminal cases rose 22 per-
cent, explosions increased 9 percent, and murders increased almost 6 percent.95
In a very interesting development that bears continued scrutiny, the Chinese
government has increased the number of troops assigned to the People’s
Armed Police by fourteen divisions, to about 1 million men total. The mission
of the People’s Armed Police is to maintain internal stability, in particular by
quelling incidents of domestic unrest and rioting typically caused by economic
complaints regarding unemployment and taxes. According to policy analysts
John Corbett and Dennis Blasko, “By increasing the size of the People’s Armed
Police, the leadership in Beijing implicitly acknowledges that internal unrest is
a greater threat to the regime’s survival and Chinese economic modernization
than is foreign invasion.”96
In a move fraught with ominous historical parallels, however, many of the
new members of the People’s Armed Police are what one expert termed “the
dregs.”97 As noted, the use of bare branches by various Chinese dynasties to
control other bare branches typically backªred. The abuses, corruption, and vi-
olence of the “co-opted” bare branches came to rival those of the bare-branch
bandits they were supposed to be controlling. Keeping these “troops” close to
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rich metropoles proved to be a very unwise strategy. In Robinson’s study of
mid-Ming banditry and rebellion, he ªnds that many of the foremost bandit
and rebel leaders were formerly in the imperial military. Indeed some were still
in the military while engaging in pillage and brigandage. As Robinson puts it,
“Managing these men of force was a delicate balance, and the price of failure
could be very high. The same factors that made these men attractive to military
ofªcers, civil ofªcials, and local gentry were precisely those that made them
most dangerous—skill in arms, physical bravery, a willingness to use violence,
a band of followers, and ties that extended beyond the conªnes of local society.
Allied with proper authorities, these men were a potent addition to the forces
of order. If, however, relations between these men and the powers that be
broke down, they became a frightening avatar of social chaos.”98
india
Much the same analysis can be made concerning India today, where the bare
branches are to be found primarily in the north and northwest states.99 Inter-
estingly, these states are referred to as India’s “Wild West,” and hold almost
half of India’s population, as well as the highest fertility rates in the country
and the highest sex ratios.
Power in these states, especially Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar, comes from
the organized criminal gangs (goondas) embedded deeply in their societies. Pri-
vate armies abound, and corruption has led to the development of a
kleptocracy, in which gangs are now elected ofªcials in state government.
More than 10 percent of Bihar’s legislators are well-known criminals. In Uttar
Pradesh, 132 of 424 members of the Vidhan Sabha are “suspected criminals.”100
In commenting on the pervasiveness of violent crime in Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, one journalistic account notes, “In Uttar Pradesh, kidnapping is a way of
life, especially in the western UP. Most gangs are politically connected.” Re-
garding Bihar, the account continues, “Kidnapping is one of the main growth
industries. Two people are snatched for ransom every day.”101
Indeed there is a statistically signiªcant relationship between violent crime
rates and the sex ratio in Indian states. Sen notes that “extensive interdistrict
contrasts . . . show a strong—and statistically very signiªcant—relation be-
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tween the female-male ratio in the population and the scarcity of violent
crimes. Indeed, the inverse connection between murder rates and the female-
male ratio in the population has been observed by many researchers.”102 Using
1981 crime statistics, Philip Oldenburg was able to show a striking correlation
in Indian states and also in districts of Uttar Pradesh between the sex ratio and
the murder rate. The calculated Pearson’s r was 0.72 (sex ratio deªned as
number of females per 100 males). Indeed the states with the worst sex ratios—
the states of the north and northwest of India—are termed by Oldenburg “the
Bermuda Triangle for girls.”103
Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera replicated Oldenburg’s research, correlating
murder rates (1980–82) with the female-to-male sex ratio (1981), in addition to
other variables such as urbanization, poverty rate, literacy rate, and so forth.
The strongest correlation found was between murder and sex ratio, which
were inversely related. As the authors note, “This correlation is very robust: no
matter which other variables are included or excluded from the regression, we
found that the female-male ratio remained highly signiªcant, always with a
negative sign. Further, the size of the coefªcient of the female-male ratio is
quite large.”104 We updated the above analyses by using the 1991 census data
and the most recent murder rate available (1997) and found the same strong re-
lationship, yielding p  .07. This is prima facie evidence that this linkage has
persisted in India through the late 1990s.
The robust and persistent link to be found in the Indian case leads us to the
same conclusion as Dreze and Khera: “What seems clear is that there is a
strong link of some kind between gender relations and criminal violence (not
just violence against women, but violence in the society as a whole). . . . This is-
sue may be crucial in understanding criminal violence in many societies.”105
Conclusions
Francis Fukuyama has wondered whether the democratic peace phenomenon
is better explained by the status of women in democracies than by the exis-
tence of democratic institutions themselves.106 Our analysis takes this one step
A Surplus of Men, A Deªcit of Peace 35
102. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 200.
103. Philip Oldenburg, “Sex Ratio, Son Preference, and Violence in India: A Research Note,” Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, Nos. 49 and 50 (1992), pp. 2657–2662.
104. Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera, “Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide
Data,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2000), p. 342.
105. Ibid., p. 347.
106. Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77,
No. 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 24–40.
further. In a way, the very type of government to which a nation can aspire
may be tied to the status of women in society. When that status is very
low, the possibilities for a full and meaningful democracy and for a peaceful
foreign policy are distinctly less. High sex-ratio societies, denoting a very
low status for women, cannot be expected to emulate normal sex-ratio societies
either in terms of their form of government or in terms of their tendency to-
ward peacefulness. Any attempts at that emulation may prove, historically
speaking, to be short-lived. And any attempts by scholars from normal sex-ra-
tio societies to project their own security logic onto a high sex-ratio society will
lead to miscalculation. High sex-ratio societies simply have a different security
calculus.
Our analysis does not lend itself to precise prediction. Nevertheless, a few
broad prognostications can be put forward. First, the prognosis for the devel-
opment of full democracy in China is poor. The prognosis for the maintenance
of a viable democracy in India (or Pakistan for that matter) is troubled. These
are all high sex-ratio societies, and their governments will be hard-pressed to
deal with the ever-increasing numbers of bare branches that will arise in the
next few decades. A move toward authoritarianism is much more likely, ac-
cording to our analysis. As mentioned, we would also expect, in the case of In-
dia (and Pakistan), an increase in sectarian and ethnic violence.
Second, the prognosis for a conºict such as that over Kashmir between India
and Pakistan is likewise poor. India and Pakistan, both high sex-ratio societies,
are unlikely to settle the conºict peacefully. Though there may be occasional
movements toward a settlement, we predict that the conºict will either remain
a protracted war of attrition or, possibly, become an open interstate war. Each
society has plenty of bare branches to spare in such a conºict—and the respec-
tive governments might be happy to spare them. Likewise, any compromise or
conciliation will probably be viewed as humiliating by a high sex-ratio society.
We found it noteworthy that the 1999 Pakistani pullback from Kashmir was
followed in short order by a military coup in that nation.
We are tempted to suggest that the same logic would apply to the China-
Taiwan controversy, but the international ramiªcations are much broader
there, and deterrence may remain effective in this situation. Nevertheless, it
should never be forgotten by policymakers on either side of the Paciªc that the
worst-case scenario implies that China may have close to 40 million young
adult bare branches to spare in twenty years, and that the government may at
that point ardently wish to see them give their lives in pursuit of a national in-
terest. The alternative is to allow them to remain a threat to national interest,
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which may increasingly be seen as an untenable policy position by the
government.
The bottom line is that the politics of handling signiªcant numbers of bare
branches are liable to become a more pronounced and more explicit part of
government calculation in these nations. The relationship we see is not
straightforward cause and effect: Strife and war obviously take place within
and between normal sex-ratio cultures as well. Nevertheless, exaggerated gen-
der inequality, as we have seen, may provide an aggravating catalyst to the
mix of insecurity factors leading to conºict. All we have found suggests that
high sex-ratio societies in contexts of unequal resource distribution and gener-
alized resource scarcity breed chronic violence and persistent social disorder
and corruption. Though these phenomena certainly exist as well in societies
without high sex ratios, the bare branches of high sex-ratio societies present an
unmistakable aggravating and amplifying effect, leading to disruption on a
larger scale than might be possible in societies with lower sex ratios.
In conclusion, exaggerated gender inequality is a potentially serious source
of scarcity and insecurity. As Barbara Miller has argued, a normal sex ratio is a
“public good,” and governments that fail to preserve that public good do their
societies a disservice with tangible negative consequences.107 The scale on
which sex ratios are being artiªcially altered in Asia today is, generally speak-
ing, unprecedented in human history. What are the consequences of this vast
demographic shift? What happens to societies that explicitly select for increas-
ing and disproportionate numbers of bare branches? We suggest that societies
with young adult sex ratios of approximately 120 and above are inherently un-
stable, and both China and India are, at this writing, nearing that level and will
probably surpass that level in the next two decades.108 We stand at the thresh-
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old of a time in which these young surplus males will increasingly ªgure into
the deliberations of Asian governments. Not only the nations of Asia, but the
nations of the world will want to pay close attention to the ramiªcations of
Asia’s spiraling sex ratios and the policy choices they force upon Asian gov-
ernments. How ironic it would be if women’s issues, so long ignored in secu-
rity studies as simply irrelevant, became a central focus of security scholars in
the twenty-ªrst century.
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